Struct rustls::sign::CertifiedKey [−][src]
pub struct CertifiedKey {
pub cert: Vec<Certificate>,
pub key: Arc<Box<dyn SigningKey>>,
pub ocsp: Option<Vec<u8>>,
pub sct_list: Option<Vec<u8>>,
}
Expand description
A packaged-together certificate chain, matching SigningKey
and
optional stapled OCSP response and/or SCT list.
Fields
cert: Vec<Certificate>
The certificate chain.
key: Arc<Box<dyn SigningKey>>
The certified key.
ocsp: Option<Vec<u8>>
An optional OCSP response from the certificate issuer, attesting to its continued validity.
sct_list: Option<Vec<u8>>
An optional collection of SCTs from CT logs, proving the
certificate is included on those logs. This must be
a SignedCertificateTimestampList
encoding; see RFC6962.
Implementations
Make a new CertifiedKey, with the given chain and key.
The cert chain must not be empty. The first certificate in the chain must be the end-entity certificate.
The end-entity certificate.
Steal ownership of the certificate chain.
Return true if there’s an SCT list.
Steal ownership of the SCT list.
pub fn cross_check_end_entity_cert(
&self,
name: Option<DNSNameRef<'_>>
) -> Result<(), TLSError>
pub fn cross_check_end_entity_cert(
&self,
name: Option<DNSNameRef<'_>>
) -> Result<(), TLSError>
Check the certificate chain for validity:
- it should be non-empty list
- the first certificate should be parsable as a x509v3,
- the first certificate should quote the given server name (if provided)
These checks are not security-sensitive. They are the server attempting to detect accidental misconfiguration.
Trait Implementations
Auto Trait Implementations
impl !RefUnwindSafe for CertifiedKey
impl Send for CertifiedKey
impl Sync for CertifiedKey
impl Unpin for CertifiedKey
impl !UnwindSafe for CertifiedKey
Blanket Implementations
Mutably borrows from an owned value. Read more